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Chapter 9. Corporate Governance in Jordan: Role of the External 
Auditor 
 
Bashar H Malkawi 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In our globalized world, competition for capital is intense and only jurisdictions 
with superior corporate governance will attract the FDI crucial for economic 
growth and development.29 Corporate governance encompasses numerous 
aspects of how a business is governed and the relationship between the company 
and various stakeholders. An important marker of good corporate governance is 
transparent and reliable financial reporting since investment decisions are based 
on financial statements which must be reliable and trustworthy. Indeed, accurate 
financial reporting of publicly-traded companies constitutes “the” source of 
information for a myriad of stakeholders including: company manager; 
shareholders, government regulators and potential investors.30 If company 
financial statements cannot be trusted, investors can be victimized31and 
economic development deterred as capital is unlikely to be invested when fraud 
is a concern. Recent multi-billion dollar global corporate accounting scandals 
prove the crucial importance of company external auditors in corporate 
governance.32   
An external auditor, through his professional opinion, plays a significant role 
in validating financial statements. The auditor’s responsibilities include 
examining the company’s books and records and preparing a comprehensive 
report summarizing the auditor’s findings and conclusions regarding the 
financial standing of a company.33 In addition, the auditor may propose solutions 
                                                          
29 See Jingchen Zhao, Promoting a More Efficient Corporate Governance Model in Emerging Markets through Corporate Law, 15 Wash. U. 
Global Stud. L. Rev. 447, 471 (2016). 
30 See James A. Fanto, Internationalization of Securities: Article: The Absence of Cross-Cultural Communication: SEC Mandatory Disclosure 
and Foreign Corporate Governance, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 119, 135-146 (1996). 
31 Jordan had its headline-grabbing corporate scandals involving companies and banks. One corporate scandal involved Petra Bank which was 
Jordan’s second bank. Due to poor auditing controls, Petra Bank collapsed and became one of the biggest corporate scandals in Jordan’s history. 
See A Delicate State of Affairs, The Economist (Oct. 4, 2003). Other cases involved four local banks. See Isam Qadamani, White Revolution in 
Banks, Al-Rai Newspaper (July 2, 2007).   
32 For example, the "Enron scandal" in 2001 involved irregular accounting procedures throughout the 1990s which led Enron to file for bankruptcy 
protection. Many of Enron’s debts and losses were not reported in its financial statements. See William W. Bratton and Adam J. Levitin, A 
Transactional Genealogy of Scandal: from Michael Milken to Enron to Goldman Sachs, 86 S. Cal. L. Rev. 783, 822-825 (2013). Post-Enron scandal, 
it was the collapse of the US giant telecommunications company WorldCom in 2002. The debt of that company has reached in that year the amount 
of 28 billion USD and, at the same time, its general manager got a loan from the company of 366 million USD. See Warren G. Lavey, Responses 
by the Federal Communications Commission to WorldCom's Accounting Fraud, 58 Fed. Comm. L.J. 613, 621 (2006). See also Joel Slawotsky, 
The Virtues of Shareholder Value Driven Activism: Avoiding Governance Pitfalls, 12 Hastings Bus. L.J. 521, 560 (2016) (Toshiba admitted to a 
huge multi-year, billion-dollar accounting scandal, after being caught. The once mighty business entity has suffered huge financial losses, a plunging 
share price and debt cut to junk). 
33 Over the years, there have been charges that companies hide information and claims of fraud on the part of auditors. See M. Al-Basheer, The 
Non-Seriousness of the Regulatory Authorities Prevented Stopping Corruption and Failure of Companies, Al-Rai Newspaper (Apr. 21, 2001). 
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for weaknesses in company's finance and assist management in increasing 
production capacity of the company.  
Due to the substantial role the auditor plays in the company's affairs, the 
Jordanian legislator enacted several provisions in order to articulate the external 
auditor's rights and duties. The legislator carved out a special section in the 
Company Legislation No. 22 of 1997 to deal with matters such as election of an 
auditor, contents of auditor's report, attendance of the general assembly 
meetings, and prohibitions.  
Given the remarkable changes due to globalization in recent years, regional 
transformations and the intense competition for foreign direct investment, 
Jordan’s government has instituted a strategic plan “Jordan 2025” in a bid to 
raise Jordanian competitiveness and revitalize the economy.  To the extent that 
Jordan seeks to become a center of finance and trade, a stable and reliable legal 
system is essential. To successfully achieve the goal of becoming a financial 
center, investors need to have confidence that Jordanian companies will 
accurately report their results.  This in turns calls for an analysis of the current 
law on auditors in Jordan.   
The goal of this chapter is to assess the legal regime of external auditors – as 
opposed to internal auditors - per Company Legislation of 1997 and provide 
suggestions for improvement in the current legal regime.34 Part II discusses 
global trends in corporate governance with respect to the role of the external 
auditor.  Part III of the chapter provides an overview of the development of the 
auditing profession in Jordan. In Part IV, the chapter analyzes in detail the 
specific provisions related to auditors in the Company Legislation of 1997.  The 
part also points out various shortcomings and inconsistencies between rights and 
duties of auditors and makes suggested proposals for amending the current law.    
 
THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR IN THE CONTEXT OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE  
 
Jordan has instituted a long term plan “Jordan 2025” in a bid to strengthen and 
modernize the Jordanian economy.35  The principal goal of “Jordan 2025” is to 
                                                          
34 See Jillian M. Lutzy, Analysis of the Proposed NYSE Corporate Governance and Audit Committee Listing Requirements, 2 DePaul Bus. & 
Comm. L.J. 99, 112, 131-132 (2003). While internal Audit refers to an ongoing audit function performed within company by its employees, an 
external audit is an audit function performed by a third party which is not a part of the company. The objective of the internal audit is to review 
the routine activities and provide suggestion for the improvement. On the other hand, the objective of the external audit is to check and verify the 
financial statement of the company. See The UK Chartered Institute of Internal Auditors, Internal's Audit Relationship with External Audit, IIA 
Policy Paper (2015), available at < https://www.iia.org.uk/media/1042664/internal-audit-relationship-with-external-audit-march-2015.pdf >. See 
also  Mishiel Said Suwaidan and Amer Qasim, External Auditors' Reliance on Internal Auditors and its Impact on Audit Fees: An 
Empirical Investigation, 25 Managerial Auditing Journal 509, 520 (2010) (external auditors in Jordan consider the objectivity, 
competence and work performance of internal auditors as very important factors affecting their reliance decisions ). 
35 see Jordan 2025, available at < http://inform.gov.jo/en-us/by-date/report-details/articleid/247/jordan-2025> (last visited June 20, 2017).  
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implement the right policies and legal structures to foster “a dynamic private 
sector that is able to compete internationally.”36  
The blueprint envisions Jordan as a regional economic gateway to regional 
markets that is also taking advantage of free trade agreements the Kingdom has 
signed with several countries in order to achieve an export-oriented economy.37 
A successful implementation of “Jordan 2025” requires a high level of 
corporate governance since this is inextricably linked to healthy capital markets, 
an ability to attract and retain FDI and generally superior economic 
performance.38  Investors are unlikely to pour capital into a nation which does 
not promote a transparent and reliable financial reporting governance 
environment. Jordanian FDI has not been robust, “FDI inflows, which remains 
modest with respect to local investments and as a share of GDP.”39 According to 
the World Bank the lack of robust FDI is: 
traceable to the weak and inefficient institutional environment. Jordan ranks 71 
in the World Economic Forum’s 2011/12 Global Competitiveness Report, ahead 
of Morocco (73) but behind Tunisia (40) and the Gulf economies. The country has 
fallen from 50th position in 2009 because of deterioration in its institutional 
environment, government bureaucracy, and financial markets.40 
Therefore, improving governance is important to facilitating Jordan’s plans 
of an improved and modern economy capable of competing in a globalized market. 
The role of the auditor in corporate governance is vital since investors depend on 
transparent, accurate and reliable financial reporting.  Lackluster laws on 
auditors can indicate poor corporate governance. There should be no tolerance for 
managerial and employee wrongdoing. An economy may be derailed by allowing 
management to continue to mismanage the corporate sector through accounting 
“irregularities”. Weak corporate governance will scare off foreign investors and 
an economy will decline.   
Jordan, to compete in a globalized world, must modernize its corporate 
governance and in particular, must ensure best practices for the role of the 
auditor. The following part discusses the development and regulation of auditors 
in Jordan.   
 
                                                          
36 see Omar obeidat, gov’t launches ‘Jordan 2025’ development blueprint, jordan times, available at 
<http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/gov’t-launches-jordan-2025’-development-blueprint> (may 11, 2015). 
37 id. 
38 see Ronald j. Gilson, transparency, corporate governance and capital markets, the latin American corporate governance roundtable (2000), 
available at <http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/1921785.pdf> (last visited sep. 12, 2017). 
39 see Jordan economic monitor, maintaining stability and fostering shared prosperity amid regional turmoil, page 23, available at < 
www.worldbank.org.jo >. 
40 Id. at page 25. 
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DEVELOPMENT AND INCIPIENT REGULATION OF THE AUDITING 
PROFESSION IN JORDAN 
 
The auditor profession in Jordan has undergone dramatic growth since the first 
audit office, George Khader's firm, opened in 1944.41  Saba & Co, a prominent 
Arab audit firm, established its branch office in Jordan in 1948.42 In the ensuing 
years, the profession has increased in size and sophistication and currently, there 
are almost 200 audit firms and offices including firms affiliated with the Big Four 
and other global firms.43 International auditor firms, especially those associated 
with Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, dominate the market for auditing banks and 
insurance companies, and have a considerable share of the audit market for other 
corporations.44 In addition to domestic companies, foreign companies operating 
in Jordan must have their subsidiaries audited by Jordanian licensed auditors.   
Regulation of the audit profession in Jordan is a relatively recent 
phenomenon; as recently as 1961, audit practice was unorganized and 
practitioners were not required to satisfy any level of academic knowledge or 
work experience.45  Thus, any person was inherently eligible to practice auditing 
regardless of educational qualification or skill level.  
The first audit qualification law was enacted in 1961 and outlined certain 
conditions that had to be fulfilled by an individual licensed to practice audit.46 
However, the law did not fully enumerate the duties and rights nor specify 
prohibited activities for an auditor.47 In sum, the 1961 law provided lax conditions 
for practicing auditing.  
Given economic development in Jordan in the 1970s and 1980s and the 
increasing number of publicly traded shareholding companies,48 a need arose for 
a more comprehensive and updated audit law, leading to the issuance of the Law 
                                                          
41 See Ahmed Saadah, The Evolution of the Accounting and Auditing Profession in Jordan, Vol. 29 The Auditing Journal 23-25 (1996). 
42 Id. 
43 See Modar A. Abdullatif, The Role of Auditing in Jordan: An Empirical Study Expectations 85 (2003) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 
University of Manchester) (on file with author). The Big Four are: Deloitte & Touche LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, KPMG LLP, and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP.  
44 See Mohammad Ebrahim Nawaiseh, Can Earnings Management be Influenced by Audit Quality? 5 International Journal of Finance and 
Accounting 209, 210 (2016).  
45 See N.S. Khouri, The Evolution of the Audit Profession in Jordan, Al-Iqtisadi Al-Urduni (The Jordanian Economist) 82-83 (1994). 
46 See Law of Practicing the Auditing Profession No. 10 of 1961 (permitted licensing of individuals possessing intermediate school certificates 
and six years of experience).    
47 See K.A. Abdullah, The Audit Profession in Jordan and Kuwait: A Comparative Analytical Study, 9.2 Dirasat Journal 131-151 (1982). 
48 Since the establishment of Amman Financial Market and then the founding of Amman Stock Exchange, trading has increased. For instance, 
trading on the Secondary Market rose from JD9.7 million in 1978 to JD3.0 billion in 2013; market capitalization of subscribed shares is currently 
around JD18.2 billion, as compared to around JD286 million by the end of 1978; and the number of listed companies went up from 66 in 1978 to 
240 by the end of 2013. Originally 57 companies were listed on Amman Financial Market, rising to 120 companies in 1988. A total of 224 of public 
shareholding companies were listed on the Amman Stock Exchange by the end of 2016, compared with 201 by the end of 2005; their market 
capitalization by end of 2016 rose to US$18,233 million, compared to US$4,943 million at the end of 2005. In addition, by the end of July 2017, 
shares owned by non-Jordanians represented 37.9% of ASE capitalization. See Amman Stock Exchange, Trading Statistics, available at < 
http://www.ase.com.jo/en/main-indices> (last visited Sep. 15, 2017).   
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of the Audit Profession No. 32 of 1985.49 The 1985 Law revised the provisions 
concerning qualifications and required that in order to be licensed; the auditor 
must possess at least a community college degree in accounting and must pass 
an exam administered by the Audit Profession Council.50 The law also empowered 
the Audit Profession Council to supervise the audit profession. The 1985 Law 
specifically banned auditors from engaging in ten acts including unethical 
advertising, disclosure of clients' information, and deliberately giving wrong 
opinions on financial statements.        
In 2003, a new law was enacted to streamline the governance of the audit 
profession.51 The 20013 law provides for the formation of a supervisory authority, 
known as the Audit Profession Association, similar to the existing one under the 
1985 Law. However, the Audit Profession Association includes both auditors and 
accountants.52 The Audit Profession Association monitors the performance of 
auditors and accountants to ensure their compliance with laws and accounting 
and auditing standards.53 These standards include not only Jordanian accounting 
rules but also GAAP and global standards. The law also substantially revised the 
level of qualification needed for practicing auditing including a requirement of 
training.54 Significantly, the 2003 law obligates certain entities, such as 
partnerships and corporations, to appoint licensed auditors.55 The mandatory 
appointment for these entities will provide additional working opportunities for 
auditors.       
The Regulation for Classifying Auditors No. 30 of 1986 classified licensed 
auditors into categories.56 For example, the Regulation for Classifying Auditors 
designated category A for the highest qualified auditors i.e. those with the 
highest academic qualifications and experiences who can audit any company or 
establishment. On the other hand, auditors in categories B and C can only audit 
specified institutions excluding banks, insurance companies, or industrial 
companies. This practice of classification was tolerated in a period when there 
few auditors with first university degree. Nowadays, this practice has changed. 
The Provisional Law on Organizing the Audit Profession No. 73 of 2003 abolished 
this classification since all auditors are required to have first university degree 
in the field and enjoy practical experience. 
                                                          
49  See Law of Auditing Profession. Law No. 32 (1985). 
50 The Audit Profession Council is mainly government-dominated and consists of twelve members such as the chairman of the Accounting 
Bureau, head of the Income Tax Department, and governor of the Central Bank of Jordan. See Khouri, supra note 17, at 83. See also M. Al-
Basheer, Regulations…Is there Anyone to Respond!!!! Vol. 47 The Auditing Journal 1 (2001). 
51 See Provisional Law on Organizing the Audit Profession No. 73 of 2003, Office Gazette No. 4606 (June 16, 2003).  
52 Id. art. 4. 
53 Id. art. 8 & 9.  
54 Id. art. 22 & 28.  
55 Id. art. 30.  
56 See also Regulation for Classifying Auditors No. 30 of 1986, Official Gazette No. 3389 (April 16, 1986).    
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The 2003 law and its implementing regulation provide guidelines for 
promoting auditors to higher categories.57 The classification of auditors into 
categories may prove irrelevant as the majority of auditors can be classified into 
category A.58 Moreover, on average, promotion from category B or C to category 
A can be accomplished in one year or less.           
The representation of auditors is by a society rather than a union or 
federation.  In contrast to the lack of a union for auditors, unions have worked to 
improve the professions they represent by defending their rights. For instance, 
attorneys in Jordan have a union since the 1950s.59 The Jordanian accounting 
society has functional challenges when functioning as a professional body; it has 
a shortage of resources and no quality guarantee procedures to follow. Moreover, 
the 2003 law does not regulate some welfare matters such as minimum audit fees 
and social safety net programs i.e. retirement system and health insurance. The 
fact that auditors are not represented by a union may indicate that it is assigned 
a low level of importance compared to other professions such as attorneys, 
doctors, teachers, and pharmacists. 
 
REGULATION OF AUDITORS IN THE COMPANY LEGISLATION 
 
The regulation of auditors in a given country is related to that country's legal 
system. In Jordan, like other code law countries, laws stipulate minimum 
requirements and rules tend to be highly prescriptive and procedural.60 The 
degree to which rules are legislated can substantially impact the nature of the 
auditing regime. 
The Company Law No. 22 of 1997 (“1997 Company Law”) is considered a 
major source for regulating auditors.61 In addition to regulating general matters 
related to companies, the 1997 Company Law governs auditors. For example, the 
issues of auditors' election, remuneration, report, and liability are dealt with in 
                                                          
57 The guidelines include possessing additional university degree, additional experience, or professional qualification. See Provisional Law on 
Organizing the Audit Profession No. 73 of 2003, supra note 23, at art. 26.  
58 Category A requires a minimum of a first university degree in accounting and three years of experience in accounting and auditing. Id. 
59 See History of Jordan Bar Union, available at <http://www.jba.org.jo/AboutUs/AboutUs.aspx> (last visited April 12, 2017). In the U.S., the 
American Bar Association (ABA), founded August 21, 1878, is a voluntary bar association of lawyers, law students, and others interested in the 
law and the legal profession. The ABA's most important stated activities are the setting of academic standards for law schools, and the 
formulation of model ethical codes related to the legal profession. See Quintin Johnstone, Bar Associations: Policies and Performance, 15 Yale L. 
& Pol'y Rev. 193, 207, 212 (1996).  
60 In common law countries, such as the United States, laws establish limits beyond which it is illegal to venture, and within those limits 
experimentation is encouraged. See Stephen Salter & Timothy Doupnik, The Relationship between Legal Systems and Accounting Practices: A 
Classification Exercise, 5 Advances Int'l. Acct. 3 (1992) (provides empirical support for the hypothesis that a legal system is a significant 
predictor of auditing practices and concludes that a dichotomization of accounting practices, procedures, and rules consistent with the common 
law/code law classification of legal systems).     
61 See Company Law No. 22 of 1997 as amended by Provisional Law No. 17 of 2003, Official Gazette No. 4589, art. 192. a (March 16, 2003).  
Other laws relating to auditors include securities, banking, and insurance laws. See Provisional Securities Law No. 76 of 2002, Official Gazette 
No. 4579 (December 31, 2002). See Banking Law No. 28 of 2000, Official Gazette No. 4448, art. 60 (August 2000). See also Insurance Law No. 
33 of 1999 as amended by Provisional Law No. 67 of 2002, Official Gazette No. 4572, art. 40 (November 17, 2002).      
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the 1997 Company Law. The following sub-sections consider these issues in 
detail.    
 
Election of Auditors 
 
The 1997 Company Law specified which companies should appoint an auditor. 
These companies include the public shareholding company; limited liability 
company; and private shareholding company. The Company Law excluded from 
the list general and limited partnerships and Mahassa Company (silent 
company).62 There is no obvious reason why the Jordanian legislator excluded 
partnerships and Mahassa Company from those companies whom their financial 
statements must be externally audited. It can be presumed that partnerships and 
Mahassa Company are generally small or medium-size companies and their 
nature do not merit appointment of auditors as they may not maintain organized 
commercial books. However, these reasons do not justify exclusion from 
appointing auditors especially knowing that auditors play an important role in 
verifying financial reports which are crucial for third parties who deal with 
partnerships and mahassa entities.  The Company Law should be amended so as 
to oblige all types of companies to appoint auditors and have their financial 
statements audited. Until such amendment is incorporated, it should be required 
that if a company is not required to appoint an auditor it should make this 
disclaimer in all contracts to alert third parties. 
Management of the company – as represented by the board of directors- 
nominates auditor(s) among those authorized to practice in Jordan. At the annual 
general shareholder meeting, the shareholders vote either in favor of or against 
that auditor.63 Significantly, the right of shareholders to elect an auditor is rarely 
exercised. Moreover, the ability to select the auditor or to effectuate a change to 
a new auditor is substantially reduced because of the ownership structure in 
many Jordanian companies.  In reality, the general meeting of shareholders’ 
rubbers stamps the decision of selecting an auditor which has already been made 
by management. Therefore, the process of selecting an auditor can be more 
accurately described as "appointment" by the controlling owner rather than a 
true election. A further issue that arises is the fact that the majority of Jordanian 
companies have concentrated ownership.64 Based upon the ownership structure 
                                                          
62 Mahassa company is a type of company that neither acquires juristic personality nor partners acquire the quality of merchants. Third parties are 
unaware of the existence of mahassa company. Thus, third parties have recourse only against partners in the mahassa company with whom they 
have dealt so long as the existence of the company is undisclosed. If the mahassa company is disclosed to third parties, it is treated as a general 
partnership with respect to such third parties. See Michael J.T. McMillen, Islamic Shari'a-Compliant Project Finance: Collateral Security and 
Financing Structure Case Studies, 24 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1184, 1233 (2001).  
63 See Company Law No. 22 of 1997, supra note 33, art. 192.a 
64 See World Bank, Corporate Governance Country Assessment: Jordan 1-2 (2004), available at 
< http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/jor_rosc_cg.pdf> (last visited Sep. 9, 2017).  
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in many large companies, the controlling shareholder generally selects the 
auditor. This state of affair presents an additional avenue for making suggested 
reforms by giving minority shareholders the opportunity to override the 
controlling/dominant owner in decision making/votes.      
The Company Law of 1997 did not include specific qualifications, whether 
academic or professional, for auditors. Rather, the matter of qualifications is 
referred to the Provisional Law on Organizing the Audit Profession No. 73 of 
2003. Auditors are appointed for one year renewable.65 However, the Company 
Law does not determine if the one-year period is renewable once or more and for 
how long.  It can be argued, though, that the general meeting of shareholders has 
the right to dismiss an auditor since it is the authority which elected him. In 
other words, an auditor should be dismissed in the same manner in which he was 
elected. Thus, if the auditor was elected by the general meeting of shareholders, 
he would be dismissed by the general meeting of shareholders. 
If the general meeting of shareholders fails to elect an auditor, then the board 
of directors shall nominate to the Companies Controller of the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade three auditors at least whereby the Companies Controller 
can select one among them.66 In this instance, the Company Law refers the 
matter to the Companies Controller considering the fact that it is the umbrella 
entity responsible for monitoring and regulating companies in Jordan.67  Rather 
than invoking this time consuming process that divests the right from the 
shareholders, the Company Law should be amended to provide that a second 
opportunity to elect an auditor will be allowed at an extraordinary meeting of 
shareholders. Under this proposal, only if the extraordinary meeting of 
shareholders fails to elect an auditor, would the Companies Controller intervene.   
In addition to the external company auditor, audit committees play an 
important role in accounting matters. Audit committees of corporate boards of 
directors are central to corporate governance in many countries.68 Audit 
committees oversee, among other things, the financial reporting process which is 
important to promote reliable financial statements. Thus, Audit committees 
protect investors and other stakeholders by aiding in deterring, detecting, and 
preventing fraudulent financial reporting. At present, there is no such 
mechanism in Jordan. The Company Law of 1997 should be revised to allow 
companies to establish an audit committee. 
                                                          
65 See Company Law No. 22 of 1997; supra note 33, at art. 192.a. 
66 Id. art. 192.b.  
67 See Companies Controller Directorate, An Overview 2-3 (2007) 
68 See Kon Sik Kim, Transplanting Audit Committees to Korean Soil: A Window into the Evolution of Korean Corporate Governance, 9 Asian-
Pacific L. & Pol'y J. 163, 171-180 (2007) (discussing which directors should serve on the audit committee, the scope of its duties, and how it 
should operate).  
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The external audit fee is determined either by the general meeting of 
shareholders or the board of directors.69 Audit fee in Jordan is regarded as low 
especially if compared with other countries. For example, audit fee for public 
shareholding companies stands at JD 1500 (equivalent to US $2116).70 Arguably, 
managers of companies do not appreciate or value the role of auditing and 
perceive auditing as a service that does not provide tangible value. Alternatively, 
it may be the self-interest of managers who have conflicts of interest with the 
company that “incentivizes” low compensation so as to avoid substantial scrutiny.  
Managers might not want to push for higher fees to avoid comprehensive review.  
From an auditor's viewpoint, they may accept the audit missions offered at low 
prices in the hope that they will deliver profitable consultancies, taxation review, 
and non-audit services for the same client. However, the low level of auditor's fee 
may adversely affect his performance since he may not be able to meet all 
required duties at such a remuneration level.71 Further regulations should set a 
minimum level of auditor's fee commensurate with his duties and risks. In the 
alternative, the market itself could set the price i.e. de-regulation. 
 
Auditors Independence 
 
The auditor must be objective in reviewing financial statements and an auditor's 
independence from his client is one of the hallmarks of superior corporate 
governance. To be objective, the auditor must at from the outset of the 
relationship and throughout the engagement maintain his independence. The 
1997 Company Law does not define the term "independence."72 Rather, the 1997 
Company Law enumerates the kinds of relationships and activities that create 
conflicts of interest and could cause the auditor to jeopardize his independence.  
For example, an auditor is prohibited from participating in the establishment of 
a public shareholding company.73 Auditors are also barred from serving as a 
member of a company's board of directors, partner to any member of the board of 
                                                          
69 See Company Law No. 22 of 1997, supra note 33, at art. 192.a. See also Jordanian Court of Cassation, Case No. 2002/575, Adaleh Publications 
(March 13, 2002). 
70 See Jordan Association of Certified Public Accountants, Circular (June 19, 2007).   
71 However, courts in Jordan held that auditors should do their job in proper manner even though their remunerations were low. See Court of 
Cassation, Case No. 1976/135, Jordanian Bar Association Journal 1907 (January 1, 1976) (Although the auditor audits accounts for the company 
once or twice a month and his fees are low, he must do his work properly). See also Husam Al-Khaddash, Rana Al Nawas, and Abdulhadi Ramadan, 
Factors affecting the quality of Auditing: The Case of Jordanian Commercial Banks, 4 International Journal of Business and Social Science 206, 
209 (2013).    
72 In the U.S., the Independence Standards Board provided a definition of independence for auditors. Auditor independence is both independence 
of mind - freedom from the effects of threats to auditor independence and independence in appearance - absence of circumstances that would lead 
well-informed investors and other users to conclude that there is an unacceptably high risk that an auditor lacks independence of mind. See Sean 
M. O'Connor, Strengthening Auditor Independence: Reestablishing Audits as Control and Premium Signaling Mechanisms, 81 Wash. L. Rev. 
525, 566-568 (2006).  
73 See Company Law No. 22 of 1997, supra note 33, at art. 197.  Thus, an auditor could be prohibited from acting as a promoter or underwriter. 
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directors, or employee of any board member.74 These prohibitions are designed to 
disconnect the auditor from any financial interest whatsoever in the company. 
Over the years, auditing firms have come to offer many types of services to 
their audit clients.75 Now, the ability of auditing firms to perform such services 
is limited. The 1997 Company Law prevents an auditor from providing 
"permanently" any technical, administrative or consultancy services to a 
company whose accounts he audits. In other words, an auditor is not permitted 
to engage in non-audit services which can include, for example, financial 
consulting, pension services, and marketing services.76 These services may be 
unsuitable for the role of auditors. Additionally, by providing non-audit services, 
companies can exercise leverage over auditing firms to influence their opinions 
on the financial statements. Therefore, any non-audit service provided to clients 
will violate the 1997 Company Law prohibitions. However, the prohibitions are 
limited to "permanent" delivery of non-audit services. Thus, "temporary" or 
"circumstantial" delivery of non-audit services may be permitted. The 1997 
Company Law should be amended to prohibit the delivery of non-audit services 
without distinction between permanent and temporary because both have the 
same undesired effects. This would bring Jordan in line with global best practices 
and enhance corporate governance.  
Rotation of auditors every three or four years should be a priority for 
legislative amendment to law. This allows for transparency and avoiding any 
cases of potential conflict of interests.77 Another significant area for improvement 
is the meaning of the term “independence” found in the 1997 Company Law.   The 
term is general and in some cases can be interpreted ambiguously.  For example, 
the 1997 Company Law does not define with sufficient clarity the term 
"participation" in the establishment of a company which would prohibit an 
auditor from delivering his services to this company. Furthermore, it is not clear 
if any of the prohibitions against an auditor extend to his immediate family. 
Because there is no guidance, interested parties may have difficulty applying the 
existing independence rules to the large number of potential permutations. 
Moreover, the 1997 Company Law refers to absolute prohibition when listing its 
independence rules. The law should permit certain activities but restrict their 
                                                          
74 Id. 
75 See Andrew D. Bailey, Jr., The MultiDisciplinary Practice of Certified Public Accountants and Lawyers, 52 Case W. Res. 895, 897, 902 (2002) 
(the breadth of non-audit client/management services had increased to the point that it is the norm to refer to the "business" of public accounting 
rather than the "profession").   
76 See Matthew J. Barrett, "Tax Services" as a Trojan Horse in the Auditor Independence Provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 
463, 472, 486 (2004). Auditing firms have attempted to expand their services to include certain legal services. See Alison H. Mijares, The Securities 
and Exchange Commission's Ban on Legal Services by Audit Firms: Amendments to Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X Under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 36 U.S.F. L. Rev. 209, 226-228 (2001).   
77 See Mahmoud Ababneh, The Phenomenon of Companies Corruption, 40 Journal of Law 359, 385-386 (2016).  
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extent or permit certain activities but require the auditor to publicly disclose 
information about them.  
No Judicial decisions exist in which an auditor's independence was an 
important issue. Due to the non-existence of judicial cases that address auditor 
independence, courts have not had the opportunity to act as policymakers in this 
area. Thus, the Jordanian legislator ought to modernize independence rules of 
the Company Law to be more finely tuned.  
 
Duties of Auditors 
 
Although the auditor comes to the company as a contractor under a contract, he 
assumes a responsibility transcending any employment relationship. The auditor 
is an agent for numerous stakeholders such as company shareholders whose 
interests the auditor is charged to protect.78 The relationship between auditors 
and shareholders is a classic agent-principal issue.79 Thus, the auditor-agent 
owes duties to the shareholder-principal. The Company Law articulates several 
duties for an auditor. 
The 1997 Company Law enumerates a list of specific duties auditors are 
obligated to perform. First, an auditor is responsible for monitoring the 
company's activities.80 However, the obligation to "monitor the company's 
activities" is not specifically defined or illustrated. The obligation should be better 
defined and examples or guidance provided. As the law currently stands, the 
responsibility is general and ambiguous since monitoring the activities of the 
company may include many issues an auditor cannot be reasonably asked to 
perform such as verifying efficiency in managing the company's affairs. Further, 
the duty of an auditor to monitor the activities of the company is not backed by 
any auditing standard.81  
Second, an auditor is required to audit the company's accounts pursuant to 
recognized auditing, scientific, and technical standards.82 As for standards of 
                                                          
78 See Company Law No. 22 of 1997, supra note 33, at art. 199.   
79 The principal-agent characterization resonates well in corporate law. See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Transparency and Accountability: Rethinking 
Corporate Fiduciary Law's Relevance to Corporate Disclosure, 34 Ga. L. Rev. 505, 507-18 (2000). Another viewpoint argues that auditors cannot 
engage in an agency relationship with the shareholders where by definition they become subject to the principal's control. Auditor duties should be 
conceived in formal rather than relational terms, with fidelity going to the rules, to the texts, and to the system that auditors apply. In other words, 
an auditor is faithful to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, the elaborate system of rules and standards that determines accounting 
treatments. See William W. Bratton, Shareholder Value and Auditor Independence, 53 Duke L.J. 439, 445, 486 (2003). See also Amy Shapiro, 
Who Pays the Auditor Calls the Tune? Auditing Regulation and Clients' Incentives, 35 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1029, 1033 (2005) (auditors has come 
to serve two masters- the public and the corporation. The auditor is supposed to play the first role of scrutinizing the corporation's financial 
statements in order to give a candid assessment of quality. The auditor's actual fee-paying client, however, is the audited corporation who hires the 
auditor to play the second role, that of certifying information).     
80 See Company Law No. 22 of 1997, supra note 33, at art. 193.a. The duty to monitor the company' activities was added in the Company Law of 
1997. This duty was included in the 1989 Company Law as a general guideline, but in the 1997 Company aw Law it is included in the list of duties.       
81 See Ali A. Thnibat, Analytical Critical Study of the Consistency of the Auditors’ Duties and Responsibilities Mentioned by the Jordanian Acts 
with those of the International Auditing Standards, 31.1 Dirasat Journal: Administrative Sciences Series 10, 14 (2004).  
82 See Company Law No. 22 of 1997, supra note 33, at art.193.b. 
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auditing and accounting, the 1997 Company Law provided a relatively better 
definition compared to the previous law of 1989.83 The Company Law of 1997 
states that those standards are the accounting and auditing principles agreed 
upon internationally and required in Jordan by the designated professional 
parties. Notwithstanding this improvement, the 1997 Company Law does not 
define these designated professional parties mentioned in the law.84   
An auditor is also required to examine company's internal financial controls 
to ensure their suitability with regard to the company's business and safeguard 
its assets.85 Although the term "examining internal financial controls" is to some 
extent general and undefined, it is a common responsibility of auditors and 
conforms to International Standards on Auditing.86 Among other duties, the 
auditor is mandated to verify the company's assets, its ownership, and ascertain 
the legality and correctness of the company's obligations.87 This duty is 
considered a vital responsibility that can used to gauge the status of the company 
and ascertain the ultimate ownership/control of the company and its true market 
value. However, the 1997 Company Law is short on details regarding the 
auditor's duty to verify the company's assets. 
The 1997 Company Law expanded the power of the company auditor to 
encompass reviewing management affairs and is required to examine decisions 
of the board of directors and the general meeting of shareholders.88 For example, 
an auditor could examine a decision to purchase or sell to ensure that such 
financial transactions are done in a legal manner. The list of auditor's duties ends 
in a "catch-all" phrase. The auditor may perform any other duties as required by 
other laws.89 The "catch-all" phrase empowers the respective regulatory body to 
expand duties of an auditor as it sees fit.  Providing examples of expected auditor 
oversight would improve this aspect of the 1997 Company Law. 
Although article 193 of the Company Law of 1997 is supposed to list all duties 
of auditor, articles 202 and 203 provide for additional duties. Taken together, 
these articles form the "do's and don'ts" rules for auditors. In other words, the list 
of duties included in article 193 is drafted in a positive form. For example, 
auditors are responsible for monitoring company's performance, auditing its 
accounts, ensuring that its books were kept in a proper manner. On the other 
                                                          
83 The Company Law of 1989 did not specify what was considered as generally accepted accounting and auditing standards. The Company Law of 
1989 used the term in a vague form given that there were no such generally accepted standards applied in Jordan. 
84 Arguably, professional parties include the Audit Profession Society.   
85 Id. art. 193.c. 
86 See Thomas C. Pearson, Creating Accountability: Increased Legal Status of Accounting and Auditing Authorities in the Global Capital 
Markets, 31 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 65, 74-78 (2005).  
87 See Company Law No. 22 of 1997, supra note 33, at art. 193.d. 
88 Id. art. 193.e. 
89 Id. art. 193.f.  
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hand, articles 202 and 203 are drafted in the negative. For example, auditors are 
prohibited from disclosing information or speculating on client's shares.      
In addition, the auditor owes a duty of confidentiality and is thus prohibited 
from disclosing to shareholders and others any information that comes to his 
knowledge in the course of exercising his work.90  However, the duty of 
confidentiality does not apply when an auditor discovers fraud or any other 
violation of the laws. In the latter case, the auditor shall disclose these violations 
and report them to the appropriate authorities. In sum, the duty of confidentiality 
is not absolute but rather is inapplicable when the duty conflicts with the interest 
of shareholders and others in obtaining crucial information. 
Other new responsibilities of auditors under the 1997 Company Law include 
a prohibition on speculation.91 This duty is to be added to previous one of 
confidentiality. Due to the nature of his work, an auditor knows the nuts and 
bolts of the company and has invaluable inside information as to the business.  
The auditor can easily speculate and profit on the company's shares to gain a 
profit based upon this knowledge. Thus, to avoid speculation, the 1997 Company 
Law expressly prohibits an auditor from speculating on client's shares or 
otherwise profiting from insider knowledge.92 However, interestingly the 1997 
Company Law limits the scope of the prohibition to trading in company shares 
only. Indeed, by way of inference, the Company Law does not extend the 
prohibition to include subsidiary companies. Thus, the auditor could potentially 
profit from the inside information via debt trading, or even trading shares of 
company subsidiaries or rival companies based upon this knowledge.  Therefore, 
the law should be amended to include a comprehensive prohibition of making 
transactions in the financial markets based upon information learned during the 
auditor engagement.93   
A new feature of the 1997 Company Law is that an auditor, if unable to 
perform his/ her duties, is to withdraw from the audit engagement and disclose 
the withdrawal both to the board of directors and the Companies Controller.94 
The Companies Controller is charged with discussing the disengagement with 
the board of directors and, if unable to solve the problems, can disclose that to a 
general meeting of shareholders if deemed necessary. The law should be amended 
                                                          
90 Id. art. 202.  
91 Id. art. 203. 
92  See Bashar Malkawi, Reflections on the Securities Law of Jordan, 23 AM. U.  Int'l L. Rev. 763 (2007) (Article 108 of the Jordanian Securities 
Law deals exclusively with insider trading. This article prohibits anyone to capitalize on nonpublic information through the purchase or sale of 
securities resulting in the unjust enrichment at the expense of others). 
93 Debentures are long-term debt notes issued pursuant to a trust indenture. The contract under which debentures are generally issued is called the 
trust indenture. The trust indenture is entered into between a trustee and the issuing corporation. The trust indenture specifies the rights and 
obligations of the debenture holders and the issuing corporation and usually delineates the terms of the securities. The indenture trustee has the 
responsibility of safeguarding the interests of the debenture holders. See Nancy T. Oliver, Fiduciary Obligations to Holders of Convertible 
Debentures, 58 U. Cin. L. Rev. 751, 754 (1989).  
94 The report of the auditor must include the reasons or circumstances hindering the auditor's work. See Company Law No. 22 of 1997, supra note 
33, at art. 194. 
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to mandate public disclosure by the company to alert shareholders and other 
stakeholders of the auditor withdrawal.   
 
Auditor's Report and its Content 
 
The origin of the modern auditor's report can be traced to late nineteenth century 
British audit reporting practices.95 The purpose of auditor's report is to evaluate 
a company's financial information and state the auditor's opinion of the balance 
sheet and profits and losses account. Auditors are required to present a report to 
the general meeting of shareholders.96 The 1997 Company Law sets forth 
mandatory information that must be included in the auditor's report.       
The company whom accounts are being audited must facilitate the job of the 
auditor. For instance, the company in question must furnish documentation if 
requested by the auditor. The auditor should provide this statement whether or 
not he obtained the necessary information and clarifications. In the auditor's 
report, the auditor must include a statement that the company's management 
and board of directors provided him with information or statements he requested 
and facilitated his audit.97 The Jordanian legislator could have required the 
auditor to provide this statement only if he does not obtain the needed 
information. Thus, the auditor would not be required to supply this statement if 
he obtained the information. However, the Jordanian legislator opted to require 
the auditor to supply this statement whether he obtained the information or not.  
The auditor, in his report, is required to disclose if the company maintains 
accounts, the extent to which financial statements are prepared according to 
internationally accepted accounting and auditing standards, and the company's 
financial statements confirmed with its books.98 Again, the auditor should 
provide this information whether or not the company maintained accounts or not. 
The Jordanian legislator could have required the auditor to disclose this 
information only if the company does not maintain accounts or its financial 
statements are not prepared according to internationally accepted accounting 
and auditing standards.  
The auditor must state that auditing procedures carried out by his form, in 
his opinion, a reasonable basis to express his opinion regarding the company's 
financial position, and results of its operations and cash flow according to 
internationally accepted auditing standards.99 Hence, not only does the 1997 
                                                          
95 See Marshall A. Geiger, Setting the Standard for the New Auditor's Report: An Analysis of Attempts to Influence the Auditing Standards 
Board, 1 Studies in Managerial and Financial Accounting 7-12 (1993). 
96 See Company Law No. 22 of 1997, supra note 33, at art. 193.g. 
97 Id. art. 195.a.1. 
98 Id. art. 195.a.2. 
99 Id. art. 195.a.3. 
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Company Law require the auditor to state that the auditing procedures form a 
reasonable basis to express his opinion, but also specifies the type of information 
and documents that this obligation applies to. The information and documents 
are the company's financial position, results of its operations, and cash flow 
statement.   
The report also must include an item stating that the financial statements 
found in the board of director's report to the general meeting of shareholders 
comply with the company's records and registers.100 Once again, the auditor must 
state this item in his report whether or not the financial statements comply with 
company's records and registers.   
The auditor should report any violation of the 1997 Company Law or the 
company's articles of association that is committed during the year and which 
has a material effect on the financial position of the company, and whether any 
such violation still exists.101 The auditor's report of any violation must be within 
the limits of the information available to him or that is knowable based upon his 
professional duties.102  
This means that auditors are not required to detect violations. But if these 
violations are discovered in the course of the auditor's duty and within the limits 
of information available to him, the auditor then should report them as required 
by the law. In other words, the auditor cannot play the role of a detective and 
examine every suspicious case ex officio.    
Not every violation of the 1997 Company Law or the company's articles of 
associations should be reported. The auditor must report any violation that has 
a "material effect" on the company's operations or its financial position. The law 
does not provide a definition of "material effect" or provide examples of violations 
that have material effects.  Additionally, the Company Law does not require the 
auditor to immediately notify the board of directors or the Companies Controller 
if he discovers any violation that adversely affects the financial position of the 
company. To the contrary, any mention of violations must be made in the 
auditor's report.  
In reporting violations, a question could arise with regard to the status of 
violations that are committed but fixed later. Is the auditor required to report 
these violations or not since they are dealt with? The Company Law of 1997 does 
not provide an express answer. However, by looking at the general language used 
in reporting violations, one can assume that any violation must be stated in the 
auditor's report whether this violation still exists or is dealt with.  
                                                          
100 Id. art. 195.a.4. 
101 Id. art. 195.a.5. 
102 Id. 
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After the audit is complete, the auditor issues an opinion regarding the 
company's balance sheet and profits and losses account.103 Now, the auditor can 
issue three opinions. First, the auditor can approve without reservation the 
balance sheet, profits and losses account, and cash flow. Second, the auditor 
approves with reservation the balance sheet, profits and losses account, and cash 
flow provided that he justifies his reservation. Third, the auditor does not approve 
the balance sheet, profits and losses account, and cash flow with a justification 
for this rejection. In the latter case, the auditor sends the financial statements to 
the board of directors whereby the general meeting of shareholders requires the 
board to correct these statements.104 If the board of directors refuses to make the 
necessary changes to bring financial statements into conformity, the matter will 
be referred to the Companies Controller who appoints licensed auditors to settle 
the issue.   
The Company Law does not grant the auditor the right to issue an adverse 
opinion if he finds that financial statements do not show the company’s true 
financial position.105 The result, according to the Company Law of 1997, is that 
auditors can provide a total of three opinions: one opinion on balance sheet, one 
opinion on profits and losses account, and one opinion on cash flow. The three-
opinion arrangement creates the possibility of different combinations of opinions. 
For example, these combinations may include the case of approval without 
reservation or non-approval on all or approval without reservation on balance 
sheet and non-approval of profits and losses account and cash flow.   
There is no mention in the Company Law of the auditor's responsibility to 
attest to or certify the truthfulness of financial statements. The auditor does not 
opine on the accuracy of the financial report. Instead, the auditor opines that the 
financial statements "present fairly."106 The auditor's report is not a certification 
of a fact but an expression of opinion based on professional judgment. In other 
words, the auditor job is to express an opinion on the financial statements, which 
are the responsibility of the company's management, based on his audits. In sum, 
the audit report is not a guarantee. What supports this summation is the fact 
that audits do not evaluate all recorded transactions for a company.107 Audits are 
                                                          
103 Id. art. 195.b. 
104 Id. art. 196. 
105 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Facilitating Auditing's New Early Warning System: Control Disclosure, Auditor Liability, and Safe Harbors, 
55 Hastings L.J. 1449, 1454-1460 (2004) (discussing the circumstances leading to the issuance of adverse opinion and other forms of qualified 
opinions).   
106 The notion of "presents fairly" is a source of continuing debate and controversy over its intended meaning because reasonable minds will differ 
as to when the financial statements "presents fairly" its results. The point at which financial information no longer "presents fairly" will differ based 
upon the judgment, experience, and tolerance level of the auditor. See Arthur Acevedo, How Sarbanes-Oxley Should be used to Expose the Secrets 
of Discretion, Judgment, and Materiality of the Auditor's Report, 4 DePaul Bus. & Comm. L.J. 1, 24 (2005).    
107 Much of what an audit requires is a review by the auditor of the accounting principles used by the company and an analysis of the estimates 
made in preparation of the company's financial statements. The application of these principles depends on the particular business situation. Estimates 
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conducted by choosing a sample of transactions on a predetermined basis and 
determining if the sample chosen is properly recorded. 
The public in Jordan has been more willing to question the quality of 
auditors' work.108 Questioning of auditor's work is due to the gap between what 
auditors actually deliver and what the public usually expects, known as the 
expectation gap.109 This gap refers to a difference between auditors' 
understanding of their function and investors' expectations of the auditor's 
role.110  
 
Attendance of the General Meeting of Shareholders  
 
The Company Law compels the auditor to attend the general meeting of 
shareholders.111  Attendance of the auditor allows shareholders to discuss with 
him directly issues that arise from the financial statements of the company.112 In 
addition to the general meeting of shareholders, the law should allow 
shareholders to request a meeting with the auditor without the presence of board 
of directors or management. The purpose of such a meeting is to communicate 
with the auditor without any influence of the board of directors on the agenda of 
the meeting which may occur in the general meeting of shareholders. Meeting 
with the auditor in the absence of the board of directors can take place either 
before or after the general meeting of shareholders.     
 
Liability of Auditors 
 
Pursuant to Jordanian law, external auditors are potentially liable for failing to 
fulfill their obligations.113 Liability for failure to provide accurate reporting is an 
important incentive for auditors to be honest. Applicable legal requirements 
generally derive from relevant auditing standards and various laws. Auditors can 
be sued by the company which they audit its accounts, shareholders, and users 
of financial statements.114 Users of financial statements include investors and 
                                                          
can vary greatly as well. The auditor may interview management, confer with outside sources, and look to industry standards to determine if the 
principles applied and the estimates made are reasonable. 
108 Can you cite? 
109 See Where was the Auditor in Jordan, Vol. 1.2 The Auditing Journal 1 (1990). See also Amending Accounting Information is not the Auditor's 
Authority, Vo. 2.6 The Auditing Journal 1 (1991).  
110 The expectation gap has been examined in several countries in academic and practitioner literature including the United Kingdom, Canada, and 
the United States. See David F. Birke, Toothless Watchdog: Corporate Fraud and the Independent Audit - How Can the Public's Confidence Be 
Restored? 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 891 (2004). See also Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the "Expectations Gap" in Investor Protection: The SEC 
and the Post-ENRON Reform Agenda, 48 Vill. L. Rev. 1139 (2003).  
111 See Company Law No. 22 of 1997, supra note 33, at art. 198. 
112 Id. art. 199.b. 
113 See Jordanian Court of Cassation, Case No. 1998/336, Adaleh Publications (May 9, 1998) (the auditor is the one who drafts the auditor's 
report and signs it. Thus, the auditor is liable for what is stated in his report).  
114 See Company Law No. 22 of 1997, supra note 33, at art. 201. 
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banks that as a result of relying on the auditors' opinion will likely make poor 
investment decisions or extend credits.115 It is not clear if all the above parties 
can sue for all of the violations.116 Also, it is also not clear if the government can 
file a civil claim. 
Violations of the Company Law carry compensatory damages and criminal 
penalties.117 However, the Company Law does not determine the level or range of 
damages and jail sentences. The Company Law lacks sufficient details as to the 
standard for professional auditor liability in Jordan. It is not clear if the standard 
is mere negligence or gross negligence for instance. Also, there is no clear answer 
if punitive damages are available for intentional misconduct and if this standard 
is for all the violations or would some require less or more negligence.   
If the company has more than one auditor who committed an illegal act or 
erred, then they are jointly liable.118 Under joint and several liabilities, one 
auditor can be held liable for all damages in an action. The joint and several 
liability systems seem unfair as one auditor can be held liable for all damages 
despite the fact that he committed insubstantial or marginal audit error. In 
addition, the issue of contribution raises some controversy. For example, if 
Auditor (A) is 10% liable and Auditor (B) 90% and the plaintiff gets all the money 
from (A), it is not obvious if (A) can then sue (B) for the 90%.    
A time limit is set for bringing a civil suit against an auditor.  The statute of 
limitations period is three years starting on the date the company’s general 
shareholders meeting where the auditor’s report is read.119 The purpose of the 
time limitation is to require diligent prosecution of claims, thus providing 
predictability and finality.  
The liability language of the 1997 Company Law suggests that the auditor 
has broad and potentially unlimited liability. Thus, an auditor can be sued for 
mere negligence or mistake. Being liable for mere negligence is harsh given the 
fact that routine errors do occur.  The law should be improved by limiting the 
liability of an auditor to misconduct that rises to a level of gross negligence or 
                                                          
115 It is not an easy task to determine which users of financial statements or third parties could benefit from the audited statements and thus the 
auditor can liable to. The United States apply one of four legal standards to decide which non-clients have a cause of action against auditors: (1) 
privity; (2) near- privity; (3) the known users; and (4) the reasonable foreseeability rule. These four standards lie on a continuum. They can lead 
to different outcomes as to whether the non-client has a right to sue even when they are applied to the same set of facts. See Denzl Causey, 
Accountants' Liability in an Indeterminate Amount for an Indeterminate Class: An Analysis of Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. 
Co., 57 Miss. L.J. 379, 380 (1987). 
116 There are extensive experiences in various countries concerning third-party liability of auditors. The U.S., France, and Switzerland go quite far 
in holding auditors liable. In the Netherlands, there is third-party liability without a statutory cap under specific circumstances. By contrast, 
Germany has set a very low ceiling of one million Euro, or four million Euro in the case of listed corporations, for liability toward the corporation 
in case of an audit of annual accounts. See Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and International Regulation, 
59 Am. J. Comp. L. 1, 16 (2011). In the UK, there are two types of liability claim against an auditor: claims by his client which will be direct 
claim based on the violation by the auditor of his obligation contractual; and claims in tort by third parties who are not in any contractual 
relationship with the company's auditor but who claim damages for losses arising from his reliance on negligently audited financial statement and 
accounts. See Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd.vs Heller & Partners Ltd., 2 AII ER 575, 1963. See also Brenda Hannigan, Company Law 402 (Oxford 
University Press, 2nd edition, 2009). 
117 See Company Law No. 22 of 1997, supra note 33, at art. 201. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
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worse (recklessness, intentional).  For example, an auditor should be held liable 
if he acted with the intent to deceive or committed grossly negligent conduct. 
Alternatively, an auditor’s responsibility could be limited in proportion to his 
fault. Comparative proportional liability allocates fairly the liability between the 
company’s management and the auditor thus discouraging inflated claims and 
encouraging everyone to be aware of his responsibilities and to act diligently.   
Unfortunately, the liability of auditors has been tested only a few times in 
Jordanian courts.120 Reliable estimates of actual penalties and verdicts against 
auditors are difficult to obtain.121 Due to this state of affairs in Jordan, it is 
reasonable to expect that there are no provisions on auditor liability insurance.122 
In contrast, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and the USA 
have witnessed a substantial increase in auditor litigation.123 The Company Law 
in Jordan should specify the level of penalties and increase them to enhance the 
credibility of the audit profession and reduce possible abuse of minority 
shareholders and other stakeholders by auditors and management.  
 
CONCLUSION 
  
Superior corporate governance forms the bedrock of a prosperous economy.  An 
integral component of corporate governance is the role of transparent, accurate 
and freely available information with respect to a company’s books and records.  
Without trustworthy financial reporting, investors will be disinclined to invest in 
a jurisdiction.  The role of the external auditor in vetting financial statements 
cannot be understated.  Current and potential investors, business partners, 
employees, regulators and the public in general, rely on the integrity of the 
auditor's opinion. If investors begin to believe that the financial statements of 
companies are not accurate, they would be less likely to undertake investment. 
                                                          
120 In those few cases, auditors were prosecuted mainly on accusation of dishonesty but not on the basis of not reporting illegal acts or not 
applying professional standards of due care. Telephone Interview with two lawyers linked to corporate fraud cases in Jordan who asked for 
anonymity (April 21, 2010).   
121 Auditors involved in those cases were handed innocence verdicts or low level of penalties than can fall by obsolescence or general pardon 
given by the King on certain occasions and covering certain crimes. Id. 
122 Insurance would cover honest mistakes of judgment, but not intentional misbehavior. Persons would not want to occupy auditor positions 
unless they were protected in situations where they had simply committed errors of judgment. With insurance, moreover, a corporation does not 
have to bear the entire cost of auditor negligence, because the risk of misfeasance is spread among all corporations as a cost of doing business. 
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Securitizing Audit Failure Risk: An Alternative to Caps on Damages, 49 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 711 (2007). See 
also Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement Insurance Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 
413, 427-429 (2004) (auditors use general malpractice liability insurance to cover all engagements).       
123 For example, in 1994 at least Canadian $1.3 billion of unresolved claims were pending against Canadian accountants. In the United Kingdom, 
the Big Six (now Big Four) accounting firms faced 627 outstanding legal cases claiming damages of 20 billion by mid-1994. In Australia, 
accountants faced more than Australian $3 billion in claims by mid-1993. In New Zealand, the cost of defending legal actions brought against 
accountants has become a major business problem. In the United States, in 1993, the Big Six accounting firms' expenditures for settling and 
defending lawsuits were $ 1.1 billion or 11.9% of U.S. domestic auditing and accounting revenue. See Carl Pacini, Mary Jill Martin, and Lynda 
Hamilton, AT the Interface of Law and Accounting: An Examination of a Tend toward a Reduction in the Scope of Auditor Liability to Third 
Parties in the Common Law Countries, 37 Am. Bus. L.J. 171, 173 (2000). See also Carl Pacini, Andrew Greinke, and Sally Gunz, Accountant 
Liability to Nonclient for Negligence in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, 25 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 17, 18-20 
(2001).   
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This lack of faith and withholding of investments would eventually destroy the 
financial markets in a country. 
As described in this chapter, the law on auditors has undergone significant 
improvement, yet substantial gaps exist between current law and best practices.  
The role of management in selecting an auditor could be contained. The 
general meeting of shareholders would be empowered to elect the company's 
auditor, as opposed to the current practice of just voting in favor of or against an 
auditor already chosen by management. Information about each possible auditor 
may be included in the proxy materials so that shareholders can make informed 
decisions. The right of the general meeting of shareholders must be transformed 
into a more meaningful right to elect. As there are provisions addressing election, 
there must other provisions that address dismissal of auditors. Currently, the 
Company Law lacks provisions on the right to dismiss an auditor. In adding 
provisions to the law regarding dismissal, reasons should be provided to justify 
the decision to dismiss an auditor. However, a balance that needs to be struck in 
election and dismissal. The company structure is based on delegation by the 
board to the management of day-to-day control over company affairs. Allowing 
shareholders, the exclusive right to elect and dismiss auditors encroaches on this 
power and may also lead to inefficiencies.  
The principle of auditor's independence needs fine tuning from time to time. 
The language of independence rules found in the Company Law is general and 
even ambiguous. For example, the Company Law does not define with sufficient 
clarity the term "participation" in the establishment of a company which would 
prohibit an auditor from delivering his services to this company. Additionally, 
the Company Law prevents an auditor from providing "permanently" any 
technical, administrative or consultancy services to a company whose accounts 
he audits. Based on this language, "temporary" or "circumstantial" delivery of 
non-audit services may be permitted. The Company Law should have prohibited 
the delivery of non-audit services without distinction between permanent and 
temporary because both produce the same undesired effects.  
The Company Law lists specific duties that are required by auditors. For 
instance, an auditor is required to monitor the company's activities. The duty to 
monitor company's activities is too general and since monitoring the activities of 
the company can include many issues an auditor cannot be reasonably asked to 
perform. The auditor is prohibited from speculating on shares of the company. 
The Company Law should have widened the scope of prohibition to include shares 
and debentures.  
Auditors are required to deliver a report. The Company Law sets forth 
mandatory information that must be included in the auditor's report. The auditor 
should provide this statement whether or not he obtained the necessary 
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information and clarifications. The Jordanian legislator could have required the 
auditor to provide this statement only if he does not obtain the needed 
information. Moreover, the auditor should report any violation of the Company 
Law or the company's articles of association that is committed during the year 
and which has a material effect on the company, and whether any such violation 
still exists. The Company Law does not provide a definition of "material effect." 
Material effect may include any act that presents a serious damage to the 
creditworthiness, reputation, or standing of the company in question. 
After the audit work is complete, the auditor issues an opinion regarding the 
company's balance sheet and profits and losses account. The auditor job is to 
express an opinion on the financial statements based on his audits. The Company 
Law does not give the auditor the right to issue an adverse opinion if he finds 
that financial statements do not show the company’s true financial position. 
Auditors are legally accountable for their work. There is lack of a 
comprehensive regulation on the important issue of auditors' liability. An 
adequate liability system should be put in place and should include dissuasive 
penalties and removal of the auditor from the audit register. The Jordanian law 
must ensure appropriate disclosure of penalties to the public. Moreover, all 
auditors should be subject to quality assurance system and code of ethics. 
The current legal regime of auditors in Jordan needs revision. Amendments 
must be taken to fill in the gaps existing in the law. Attuned to these gaps, the 
legislator must enact appropriate rules. The issues raised here would give the 
legislator the tools to do so. Good regulatory reforms are likely to achieve the goal 
of corporate financial integrity and enhance corporate performance. It remains to 
be seen what will emerge from any future regulatory initiatives. 
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